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The National Crushed Stone Court's decision that sections 301(c) fac-
tors are inapplicable to a BPT variance evaluation"' and the Weyer-
haeuser and Crown Simpson courts' rejection of receiving water quality
as a section 304 BPT variance factor support the Appalachian III court's
affirmance of the EPA's 1980 BPT variance protision.11 Although the
Ninth Circuit's position in Pacific Fisheries and Crown Simpson regard-
ing a limited consideration of receiving water quality in the establish-
ment of subcategory BPT requirements is not entirely consistent with
the rationale underlying the Appalachian III court's decision,"2 the legis-
lative history of the Act" and the accepted practice of deference to the
EPA's interpretation of the Act provide strong support for the Fourth
Circuit's holding in Appalachian 111.11 After Appalachian III, courts in
the Fourth Circuit will continue to affirm the EPA's refusal to consider
receiving water quality as a BPT variance factor."'5
MICHELLE L. GILBERT
VIII. EVIDENCE
Admissibility of Similar Acts Evidence
In a criminal prosecution, the government cannot base a conviction
upon the fact that the defendant is a bad member of society and, there-
fore, is deserving of reprobation and punishment.' The prosecution may
of receiving water); supra notes 1, 67 & 127 (legislative history supports exclusion of receiv-
ing water quality as BPT variance factor).
' EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 85 (1980).
131 See Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 642 F.2d 323, 327 (9th Cir. 1981) (Crown
Simpson court's rejection of receiving water quality as BPT variance factor); Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Weyerhaeuser court's rejection of receiv-
ing water quality as § 304 factor relevant to BPT variance evaluation).
11 Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 642 F.2d 323, 328 (9th Cir. 1981); Association of
Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 807 (9th Cir. 1980).
" See supra notes 1, 67 & 127 (legislative history supports rejection of considerations
of receiving water quality).
11 See EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 83 (1980) (great deference
given to interpretation of a statute by agency charged with administration of statute).
" See 671 F.2d at 808-09 (Appalachian III court's rejection of receiving water quality
as BPT variance factor).
I Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948); United States v. Bledsoe, 531
F.2d 888, 891 (8th Cir. 1976). The Bledsoe court held that character evidence is inadmissible
unless a defendant places his general character in issue. See Bledsoe, 531 F.2d at 892; FED.
R. EVID. 404(a). The Bledsoe court noted that evidence of criminal activity told the jury, in
effect, that the defendant was a bad man. Bledsoe, 531 F.2d at 89. The Bledsoe court stated
that similar acts evidence, through emotional appeal, draws the jury's attention away from
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not use a defendant's evil character to establish the probability of crimi-
nal guilt.2 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts (similar acts
evidence) that serves solely to prove that the accused has a criminal
disposition, thus, is generally inadmissible.' Rule 404(b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence (Rule 404(b)) establishes that evidence of crimes not
alleged against the defendant is inadmissible to prove the defendant's
guilt.4 Rule 404(b), however, does provide that evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is admissible for purposes other than proof of criminal
propensity.'
the real issues in the trial and leads the jury unconsciously to render a verdict based on
false issues rather than on the true issues in the trial. Bledsoe, Id. at 891 (citing Paris v.
United States, 260 F.2d 529, 531 (8th Cir. 1919)).
2 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948); Greer v. United States, 245 U.S.
559, 560 (1918); see 1 J. WIOMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 57 (3d ed. 1940). While American
courts have held that the defendant's bad character is inadmissible evidence, the early
English common-law rule and the rule in some civil-law countries is that character evidence
is fully admissible. WIGMORE, supra, at § 193.
The European practice is to admit all relevant evidence showing the defendant's bad
character. Id. Wigmore provides illustrations that show that the evidence receives great
consideration, and that prosecutors use it freely. Id.; see Comment, Evidence of Other
Crimes as Substantive Proof of Guilt in Maryland, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 245, 245-70 (1980)
(study of Maryland law).
I See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948) (character evidence inad-
missible to show defendant's disposition); FED. R. EVID. 404. Federal Rule of Evidence 404
(Rule 404) is known as "the propensity rule" because the rule renders inadmissible character
evidence intended to show the accused's propensity to commit the crime charged against
him. See id. See generally Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defendant-A Re-
evaluation of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of
Propensity to Commit Crime, 78 HARV. L. REV. 426 (1964) (character evidence and issue of
self-incrimination).
FED. R. EVID. 404(b); see United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 141 n.5 (4th Cir.)
(Widener, J., dissenting) (Rule 404(b) codifies common-law principles), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
979 (1973). Rule 404(b) states that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible
to prove a person's character by showing that he acted in conformity with his character in
committing the crime charged. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Courts evaluate the admissibility of
other crimes evidence and similar acts evidence by balancing the probative value of the
evidence against the prejudicial impact. See United States v. Bledsoe, 531 F.2d 888, 891 (8th
Cir. 1976) (prior conviction admitted into evidence at trial); United States v. Rodriguez, 474
F.2d 587, 590 (5th Cir. 1973) (prior or subsequent incidents admitted into evidence at trial).
I FED R. EVID. 404(b). Rule 404(b) declares evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
admissible for purposes other than proof of character. Id.; see supra note 4 (similar acts
evidence inadmissible to prove character). The rule lists other acceptable purposes as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Courts have interpreted Rule 404(b) as permitting the in-
troduction of similar acts evidence for a wide variety of purposes. United States v. Johnson,
634 F.2d 735, 737 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 907 (1981); see C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE § 5240-47 (discussion of various purposes for
which similar acts evidence is admissible). Thus, the purposes expressed in the rule are not
exclusive but rather only exemplary. Johnson, 634 F.2d at 737; C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra, at § 5240 (1978). Evidence of similar acts is relevant to such a wide and unclassifiable
range of issues that the rule has become one of qualified admissibility. See, e.g., United
States v. DiZenzo, 500 F.2d 263, 265 (4th Cir. 1974) (evidence relevant to knowledge and in-
[Vol. 40:459
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In determining the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b), a
court must balance the probative value of the evidence against the pre-
judice to the defendant that would result from admitting the evidence.,
The relevance, necessity, and reliability of the evidence in question
determine the probative value,7 while the prejudice to the defendant can
be any undue tendency to suggest decision by the jury on an improper
basis.' The Fourth Circuit considered the admissibility of similar acts
evidence in United States v. Hadaway9 and held that the probative value
of the evidence outweighed any possible prejudicial effect upon the
defendant."
In Hadaway, the defendant appellant was indicted for aiding and
abetting in the theft of interstate goods and for receipt and possession of
the stolen goods.1' The Government asked the trial court for permission
tent); United States v. Stirone, 262 F.2d 571, 576 (3rd Cir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 361
U.S. 212 (1960) (evidence relevant to purpose and intent); Swann v. United States, 195 F.2d
689, 691-92 (4th Cir. 1952) (evidence relevant to intent); see also C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 190 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) (similar acts evidence relevant to wide range of issues). Federal
courts interpret the rule to mean that evidence of other offenses is admissible if relevant for
any purpose other than to show a mere propensity or disposition of the defendant to commit
the crime. See DiZenzo, 500 F.2d at 265 (relevant to show knowledge and intent); United
States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 134 (4th Cir. 1973) (relevant to show corpus delecti of
murder), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974); Loux v. United States, 389 F.2d 911, 918 (9th Cir.)
(relevant to show common plan and motive), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 867 (1968).
' See United States v. DiZenzo, 500 F.2d 263, 266 (4th Cir. 1974). The Advisory Com-
mittee Note to Rule 404(b) states that a court must determine whether the danger of undue
prejudice outweighs the probative value of evidence of the defendant's other acts. FED. R.
EVID. 404(b) advisory committee note. The court should make the determination in view of
other means of proof available as well as the factors considered under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 (Rule 403). Id. Rule 403 states that the court may exclude evidence if other fac-
tors such as the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading of the jury,
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence substantially
outweigh the probative value. FED. R. EVID. 403. Some disagreement persists as to whether
the Advisory Committee intended the Rule 404(b) reference to Rule 403 to suggest that
courts apply the Rule 403 "substantially outweighed" test. See United States v. Beechum,
582 F.2d 898, 923 n.16 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (reference to Rule
403 is to kinds of facts appropriate under Rule 403, not to "substantially outweighed" test),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979); see also, United States v. Marchesani, 457 F.2d 1291, 1297
(6th Cir. 1972) (evidence inadmissible because confusing to jury); Olin-Matheison Chem.
Corp. v. Alis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 438 F.2d 833, 838-39 (6th Cir. 1971) (evidence excluded
under Rule 403 to avoid undue prolongation and confusion of issues).
United States v. DiZenzo, 500 F.2d 263, 266 (4th Cir. 1974). Relevance alone does not
render evidence admissible because Rule 403 authorizes a court to exclude relevant
evidence if prejudice, confusion, or waste of time outweighs the probative value of the
evidence. FED. R. EVID. 403; see supra note 6 (discussion of Rule 403); infra notes 28-42 and
accompanying text (discussion of relevancy, necessity, and reliability).
I FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee note; People v. Delgado, 32 Cal. App. 3d 242,
249, 108 Cal. Rptr. 399, 405 (1973) (undue prejudice because evidence likely to lead jury
astray).
United States v. Hadaway, 681 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 219.
" Id. at 216. On September 16, 1980, a federal grand jury returned an indictment
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to introduce similar acts evidence during the examination of prosecution
witnesses. 2 The district court heard arguments from both prosecution
and defense counsel and reserved a ruling on the admissibility of the
evidence until after development of the facts. 3 After testimony of all the
Government witnesses, but before the Government rested, the district
court ruled that the similar acts evidence was admissible.14
The testimony in question implicated the defendant in the buying
and selling of stolen goods in a manner similar to the crime charged
against him. The testimony, however, described acts that occurred
after the offense charged against the defendant and for which the
Government never charged the defendant. 6 During the testimony, the
trial court instructed the jury about the limited use of the similar acts
evidence." The trial judge explained that the jury should consider the
similar acts evidence only after finding that the defendant committed
the act and then only as the evidence related to the defendant's state of
mind. 8 At the conclusion of the prosecution's case, the defendant
presented no evidence and the jury convicted the defendant of aiding
and abetting in the theft of interstate goods. 9 The defendant filed a
charging the defendant with the receipt and possession of stolen interstate goods and with
aiding and abetting in the theft. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 659 (1976); Brief For Appellee at 1,
United States v. Hadaway, 681 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Appellee's
Brief].
12 Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 216; Brief for Appellant at 2, United States v. Hadaway, 680
F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Appellant's Brief]. The Government had filed a
pretrial memorandum with the court outlining the evidence the prosecution intended to in-
troduce and reasons supporting admission. Joint Appendix at 9-19, United States v.
Hadaway, 681 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1982).
"' Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 216; see infra note 38 (district court's rationale for waiting).
" Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 216. After the district court ruled in Hadaway that the similar
acts evidence was admissible, the Government recalled the witnesses who then testified
about the criminal activities of the defendant. Id. at 217.
"5 Id. at 217. The Government recalled three witnesses who described three subse-
quent instances of conduct similar to the charged offenses. Id.
" Id. at 220-21 (Widener, J., dissenting); see supra note 4 and accompanying text
(discussion of uncharged crime issue); infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text (subsequent
acts issue); infra note 55 and accompanying text (uncharged crime issue).
"7 Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 219. After granting the defendant's counsel a continuing ob-
jection to testimony introducing other crimes evidence, the trial court instructed the jury
that the testimony in question involved transactions for which the defendant had not been
charged. Id. (jury instruction); see Appellant's Brief, supra note 12, at 6 (continuing objec-
tion).
,. Hadaway 681 F.2d at 219. The trial judge in Hadaway instructed the jury not to con-
sider the similar acts evidence at all unless the jury first found that the other evidence in
the case, standing alone, established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did the
act charged in the indictment. Id.; see infra notes 53 & 54 and accompanying text (dissent
stated that limiting instructions could have undesired effect).
19 Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 217. The Hadaway jury returned a verdict finding the defend-
ant guilty of aiding and abetting in the theft of interstate goods. Id. The district court
subsequently sentenced the defendant to a term of eighteen months, with the proviso that
[Vol. 40:459
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timely appeal contending that the trial court abused its discretion in ad-
mitting the evidence of similar acts during the prosecution's case in
chief. 0
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the Government maintained that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the evidence of
similar acts admissible to show intent and knowledge, which are ele-
ments of the crime charged.21 The defendant contended that the trial
court committed prejudicial error when the court allowed the introduc-
tion of similar acts evidence during the prosecution's case in chief,
because the prejudicial impact of the evidence outweighed the probative
value.22 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court's evaluation of the
similar acts evidence and ruled that the court did not abuse its discre-
tion in admitting the evidence.2
The Hadaway court began analysis of the similar acts evidence by
noting that the probative value of the evidence, defined as relevance,
necessity, and reliability, should be balanced against the prejudice to the
defendant to determine whether the evidence is admissible.24 In addition,
the Fourth Circuit recognized that an appellate court may properly
reverse a district court's decision on the admissibility of evidence only if
the lower court has committed an abuse of discretion.' Because ap-
pellate courts permit a district court judge wide discretion in admissi-
bility rulings,8 the Hadaway court rejected the defendant's argument
that the district court improperly admitted similar acts evidence.'
In finding the evidence of similar acts admissible, the Hadaway
court first considered the relevance of the evidence. 28 The Fourth Circuit
held that the defendant's subsequent activities increased the probability
that the defendant knowingly aided and abetted in the commission of a
crime, an element of the crime charged.2 The court noted that thinking
the defendant be eligible for parole. Appellee's Brief, supra note 11, at 1; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 4205(b) (1976) (time of eligibility for release on parole).
2 Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 216; see Appellee's Brief, supra note 11, at 1.
21 Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 216; see infra notes 30 & 31 and accompanying text (majority's
discussion of intent issue); infra notes 48 & 49 and accompanying text (dissent's discussion
of intent issue).
Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 217.
23 Id.
2 Id.; see United States v. DiZenzo, 500 F.2d 263, 266 (4th Cir. 1974) (balancing pro-
bative value against prejudice).
s Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 217; see United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 87 (4th Cir.
1980) (district court reversed only if court abused discretion); United States v.
Mastrotataro, 455 F.2d 802, 803 (4th Cir.) (same), cert denied, 406 U.S. 967 (1972).
1 Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 217; United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 87 (4th Cir. 1980)
(discretion only disturbed if court acted arbitrarily or irrationally); see infra notes 62-65 and
accompanying text (same); infra note 91-97 and accompanying text (effect of abuse of discre-
tion standard of review).
Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 217.
Id. at 217-18.
Id. at 217; see 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1976) (knowledge is element of crime of stealing in-
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in a particular illegal way over a period of time is evidence that a person
had developed thought patterns that were operating on a previous occa-
sion." Subsequent conduct, the Fourth Circuit held, is relevant and may
be highly probative of a defendant's intent at the time of the crime
charged. 1 The Hadaway court stated that the impact on the relevance
issue of the time differential between the crime charged and the subse-
quent activity is within the trial court's discretion,32 and the Fourth Cir-
cuit found no abuse of discretion."
After finding the similar acts evidence relevant, the Fourth Circuit
considered the defendant's challenge to the reliability and necessity of
the testimony describing the defendant's subsequent activities. 4
Although the prosecution's witnesses had entered into plea agreements
with the Government, 3 the Hadaway court held that the testimony was
terstate goods). Since knowledge is an element of the crime, the state had to prove
knowledge on the part of the accused to convict him. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970). See generally Lansworth, Pirsch, Krovosha, Relevancy: The Necessary Element in
Using Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Bad Acts to Convict, 60 NEB. L. REv. 657
(1981) (relevancy of other crimes evidence). Some of the evidence initially presented to the
Hadaway jury was consistent with the defendant's claim that he had no knowledge of his
friends' intent to use the truck he procurred for them in a criminal way. Hadaway, 681 F.2d
at 217. Since the subsequent acts evidence involved a similar modus operandi, the Hadaway
court held that the testimony was relevant to the issue of knowledge. Id.
' Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 217; see infra note 61 and accompanying text (DiZenzo case
and cases discussing subsequent acts). The Hadaway court rejected the defendant's claim
that the conduct in question was irrelevant because the incident occurred approximately
eighteen months after the crime charged. Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 217-18. In light of the
similarity of the defendant's subsequent acts, the Fourth Circuit found that the eighteen
month time span was not excessive enough to render the evidence irrelevant. Id. at 218.
The Government relied on United States v. Davis, which held that an interval of six years
between the crime charged and the similar crime rendered the latter too remote to be rele-
vant. Appellee's Brief, supra note 11, at 14; see United States v. Davis, 657 F.2d 637, 639-40
(4th Cir. 1981). The prosecution stressed that the lapse of eighteen months in the Hadaway
case was significantly less than six years. Appellee's Brief, supra note 11, at 14. The pro-
secution then cited United States v. Corry for the proposition that evidence of a similar act
committed three years before the crime charged was admissible. Appellee's Brief, supra
note 11, at 14; see United States v. Corry, 183 F.2d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 1950).
"' Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 217; see supra note 30 and accompanying text (subsequent
acts and time differential); infra note 61 and accompanying text (DiZenzo case and cases
discussing subsequent acts).
I See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356-57 n.10 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978).
' Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 218. The case of United States v. Shavers exemplifies an
abuse of discretion because the court admitted marginally probative, extremely prejudicial
evidence. See United States v. Shavers, 615 F.2d 266, 270-71 (5th Cir. 1980) (derogatory
statement admitted as evidence of violent character); cf. United States v. Heller, 625 F.2d
594, 599 (5th Cir. 1980) (harmless error to admit improper evidence because view of entire
record suggests evidence did not influence jury).
Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 218.
Id. The defendant in Hadaway argued that the trial court should not have permitted
testimony about similar acts because each of the witnesses had good reason to embellish his
story with a fabricated crime. Appellant's Brief, supra note 12, at 10; see United States v.
[Vol. 40:459
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
sufficiently reliable because the witnesses were unlikely to risk ex-
posure to an additional charge of perjury.36 The Fourth Circuit next ex-
amined the necessity of the evidence, the issue the court considered to
be the most seriously contested." The defendant asserted that the
similar acts evidence was unnecessary because it was introduced at a
time when there was no evidence disputing the defendant's intent. 8 The
Hadaway court, however, held that the issue of intent was not necessarily
uncontested or clearly established merely because the defendant had not
introduced any evidence when the judge ruled on the admissibility of the
similar acts evidence. 9 The Fourth Circuit noted that the evidence the
prosecution presented to the jury was inconclusive and generated uncer-
tainty about the issues of knowledge and intent." Because a jury could
interpret the defendant's conduct as innocent,4 the Hadway court held
that admission of the similar acts evidence was reasonably necessary.4"
Finally, after deciding that the similar acts evidence was relevant,
Baldivid, 465 F.2d 1277, 1288 (4th Cir.) (Sobeloff, J., dissenting) (plea bargainers have
reasons to fabricate), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047 (1972).
' Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 218. The Hadaway court commented that a defendant is
always at liberty to cast aspersions on the testimony of a plea bargainer as unfairly favoring
the government to provide a quid pro quo for the bargain. Id. The Hadaway court com-
mented that the plea bargainer's position frequently makes him extremely reluctant to com-
mit perjury. Id. The court thus concluded that the government witnesses, although plea
bargainers, were reliable. Id.
, Id. at 218-19.
Id. at 218. While the district judge in Hadaway did admit the similar acts evidence
during the prosecution's case in chief, he refused to rule on the admissibility of the evidence
until the facts developed sufficiently to reveal the transactions in the case. Id.
I Id. at 218; see United States v. Williams, 577 F.2d 188, 191 (2d Cir.) (prior crimes
evidence admitted to show defendant's intent although defendant presented no evidence),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 868 (1978).
"0 Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 218; see supra note 29 (some evidence was consistent with
defendant's claim that he innocently procured a truck for friends and was unaware of in-
tended use). The Hadaway court referred to the opening statement by defense counsel as
further reinforcement that the prosecution's evidence generated uncertainty. Hadaway, 681
F.2d at 218. The Fourth Circuit decided that the uncertainty made the evidence of similar
acts necessary. Id. at 219.
" See supra note 29 (evidence consistent with innocent version of defendant's actions).
4 Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 218. As a final note supporting the necessity of the evidence of
similar acts, the Fourth Circuit held that the introduction of evidence during the Govern-
ment's case in chief, although undesirable, was acceptable as the only opportunity to in-
troduce the evidence because the defendant offered no evidence at trial. Id. at 219. The
Hadaway court stated that the risk of admitting other crimes evidence as part of the
Government's case in chief to establish intent is that additional evidence could follow that
would establish intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Then, if other elements of the crime
were in doubt, admitting the other crimes evidence could prove unnecessary and highly pre-
judicial. Id. The Hadaway court affirmed the district court's decision that Rule 404(b) does
not delineate any proper time for the introduction of similar acts evidence. Id. at 218. The
Fourth Circuit described the district court's procedure of waiting to rule on the admissibili-
ty of the evidence until the facts of the case developed as eminently reasonable. Id.; see
supra note 38 (district court's rationale for waiting).
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reliable, and necessary, the Fourth Circuit addressed the question of
whether the prejudicial impact of the evidence outweighed the proba-
tive value.43 Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Rule 403) states
that the trial court may exclude relevant evidence if the prejudicial ef-
fect of the evidence substantially outweighs the probative value. 4' The
Hadaway court decided, however, that the trial court's repeated instruc-
tions to the jury limiting the use of the similar acts evidence largely
dissipated any possible prejudicial impact that the evidence might have
had upon the jury.4" Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the pro-
bative value of the similar acts evidence outweighed any prejudicial ef-
fect and, therefore, held that the district court had not abused its discre-
tion in admitting the evidence.
46
The Hadaway dissent argued that the similar acts evidence actually
showed nothing more than a propensity to comrhit crimes involving
stolen goods.4 ' The dissent contended that the evidence the prosecution
presented during its case in chief was sufficient to establish that the
defendant was a knowing participant in criminal activity without the
similar acts evidence.48 Emphasizing that the defendant never introduced
any evidence to challenge the prosecution's evidence on the intent issue,
the dissent declared that there was no support -for the prosecution's
assertion of necessity.49 The Hadaway dissent stated that the majority's
rationale created an exception so broad that it threatened to swallow the
general rule against admitting similar acts evidence."0 The dissent fur-
" Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 219. Rule 403 indicates that evidence can be relevant and yet
excluded because of the prejudicial impact. FED. R. EVID. 403; see supra note 6 (discussion of
Rule 403).
" FED. R. EVID. 403; see supra note 6 (discussion of Rule 403).
4' Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 219; see supra note 18 and accompanying text (jury instruc-
tions concerning limited use of similar acts evidence). While admitting that the evidence
was prejudicial in the sense that admitting the testimony increased the likelihood of convic-
tion, the Hadaway court held that the evidence did not create an unfair impression that the
defendant should go to jail, whether guilty or not. Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 219; see supra note
1 and accompanying text (bad character evidence inadmissible).
46 Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 219.
, Id. at 220 (Widener, J., dissenting).
48 Id. The Hadaway dissent pointed out that the prosecution witnesses, prior to the ad-
mission of the similar acts evidence, had already testified that the defendant knew stolen
televisions were available, that the defendant supplied the keys for a truck used to
transport the televisions, that the defendant gave money to those who stole televisions, and
that the defendant directed the stolen merchandise to -the storage place. Id.
"9 Id. at 220-21 (Widener, J., dissenting). The defendant's opening statement asserted
that the defendant's activities were not criminal. Id. Even the Hadaway majority admitted,
however, that the opening statement alone was not enough to make the similar acts
evidence admissible. Id. at 218-19. According to the dissent, the prosecution's assertion that
evidence was necessary to establish intent was pretextual and nothing less than a pre-
judicial example of overkill. Id. at 220 (Widener, J., dissenting).
Id. at 221 (Widener, J., dissenting); see infra notes 58 & 59 and accompanying text
(there are varied and numerous exceptions to general rule against character evidence). The
[Vol. 40:459
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ther asserted that the Hadaway decision exemplifies a Fourth Circuit
trend, to admit similar acts evidence that runs directly counter to
Supreme Court precedent"
The dissent further argued that, assuming the similar acts evidence
was admissible under Rule 404(b), the evidence was so prejudicial that
Rule 403 precluded admission.2 Emphasizing the prejudicial impact of
the evidence,' the dissent argued that the jury instructions explaining
the proper use of the evidence could have reinforced the prejudicial ef-
fect of the evidence in the jurors' minds.5 4 The dissent concluded that the
district court erred in admitting evidence of the defendant's similar
criminal activity for which the government never even charged, much
less convicted, the defendant.55
Hadaway dissent described the majority's reasoning as post hoc rationalization because
there was no real need to introduce the evidence. Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 221 (Widener, J.,
dissenting).
", Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 220 (Widener, J., dissenting). The Hadaway dissent argued
that the Fourth Circuit trend to admit similar acts evidence ran directly counter to
Michelson v. United States. Id.; see Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948). In
Michelson, the Supreme Court held that character evidence and other crimes evidence,
although relevant, are not admissible to show a defendant's guilt. Michelson, 355 U.S. at
475-76. The Michelson Court held that a state may not show a defendant's past trouble or
bad reputation, even if persuasive as to his probable guilt. Id. The Court stated that the
evidence is inadmissible not because evidence is irrelevant, but because the evidence is
overly persuasive and therefore prejudicial to the defendant. Id. But see Andresen v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 483 (1976) (similar acts evidence admissible to show pattern of con-
duct relevant to intent); infra note 89 (discussion of Andresen).
52 Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 221 (Widener, J., dissenting); see supra note 6 (discussion of
Rile 403).
Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 221 (Widener, J., dissenting). The Hadaway dissent stated
that the evidence showed nothing more than propensity to commit similar crimes. Id. at 220
(Widener, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the similar acts evidence convinced the
jury that the defendant was of bad character and thereby denied the defendant a fair oppor-
tunity to defend himself. Id.; see Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948);
supra note 51 (discussion of Michelson).
' Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 221 (Widener, J., dissenting). The Hadaway dissent realized
that instructions limiting the jury's use of the evidence are necessary when admitting
similar acts evidence, yet stated that the great emphasis on the testimony could have a
reverse effect on the jurors because the instructions highlight the similar acts evidence. Id.
I Id. Rule 404(b) does not require that the other criminal activity result in a criminal
conviction or even criminal charge. FED. R. EVID. 404(b); see United States v. Nolan, 551
F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir.) (although constitutional standards not met, British conviction ad-
missible because Rule 404(b) does not require proof of conviction), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904
(1977). But see United States v. Taglione, 546 F.2d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1977) (error to admit
evidence when defendant never had been indicted). Rule 404 requires only that the defen-
dant be connected to the other offense. FED. R. EVID. 404. Courts use a "clear and convinc-
ing" standard of proof when evaluating the defendant's connection to the other offense. See
United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102, 106-07 (7th Cir.) (unless prior crime evidence is clear
and convincing, probative value simply cannot justify potential for prejudice), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 946 (1979); United States v. Clemons, 503 F.2d 486, 490 (8th Cir. 1974) (conviction
reversed because other crimes evidence admitted failed to meet clear and convincing stan-
dard). But see United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 910 (5th Cir. 1978) (clear and
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The dissent, while arguing that the Fourth Circuit should have
reversed the district court's ruling, recognized a Fourth Circuit trend to
admit evidence of a criminal defendant's similar bad acts, despite the
general prohibition against the evidence. 6 The Fourth Circuit has con-
ceded that, when considering similar acts evidence, the general rule ex-
cludes use of the evidence to show the evil character of the accused.'
The exceptions, however, are so varied and numerous that, as the
Fourth Circuit stated in United States v. Woods, 8 similar acts evidence
is admissible if relevant for any purpose other than showing that the
defendant has a propensity to commit the crime. 9 In United States v.
DiZenzo,0 the Fourth Circuit ruled that evidence of subsequent conduct
by the defendant is admissible as relevant to prior intent if the subse-
quent activity was not too remote in time." In addition, as the Hadaway
court noted," the Fourth Circuit rarely will disturb the wide discretion
vested in the district courts to decide the admissibility of evidence after
balancing the probative value against the prejudice of the evidence.
63
The Fourth Circuit stated in United States v. Masters64 that the court
convincing test did not survive enactment of Rule 404(b)), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979);
infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (effect of Rule 404(b) on common law). See general-
ly J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 404[10] (1981) (clear and con-
vincing standard).
' Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 219 (Widener, J., dissenting). The dissent cited United States
v. DiZenzo as illustrative of the trend to admit similar acts evidence. Id. at 220 (Widener, J.,
dissenting); see United States v. DiZenzo, 550 F.2d 263, 265 (4th Cir. 1974) (evidence of
similar acts relevant to so wide and unclassifiable range of issues that exclusionary rule has
become one of qualified admissibility);'infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text (Fourth Cir-
cuit precedent for similar acts evidence).
" See, e.g., United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 85 (4th Cir. 1980) (court cited Rule
404(b) to hold evidence inadmissible to show criminal disposition); United States v. DiZenzo,
500 F.2d 263, 265 (4th Cir. 1974) (same); United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 134 (4th Cir.
1973) (same), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974); United States v. Baldivid, 465 F.2d 1277, 1281
(4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047 (1972); United States v. Mastrototaro, 455 F.2d
802, 803 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 967 (1972); see also FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
5 484 F.2d 127, 134 (4th Cir. 1973).
11 Id. at 134; see United States v. DiZenzo, 500 F.2d 263, 265 (4th Cir. 1974) (evidence
relevant to intent and knowledge).
0 500 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 265; see Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. 332, 361 (1842). In DiZenzo, the Fourth
Circuit held that whether the similar acts occur before or after the act charged is im-
material to admissibility. DiZenzo, 500 F.2d 263, 265 (4th Cir. 1974). The Hadaway court
stated that the fact that a person has thought in a particular illegal way over a period of
time is evidence that thought patterns had developed already and were operating on a
previous occasion. Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 217. Contra United States v. Boyd, 595 F.2d 120,
126 (3d Cir. 1978). In Boyd, the Third Circuit criticized the logic of showing prior intent or
knowledge by proof of subsequent activity. Id. The Boyd court reversed the district court's
ruling and held the evidence of subsequent criminal activity inadmissible. Id. at 127.
2 Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 217.
Id.; see United States v. Mastrototaro, 455 F.2d 802, 803 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 967 (1972).
" 622 F.2d 83 (4th Cir. 1980).
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will disturb the discretion of a district court by reversing the lower
court's admissibility ruling only if the lower court acted arbitrarily or ir-
rationally.'- The Hadaway decision upholding the trial court's ad-
missibility ruling is consistent with the Fourth Circuit trend to broadly
interpret Rule 404(b) to admit evidence of a defendant's subsequent
similar acts.66 The Hadaway decision is also consistent with the Fourth
Circuit trend to disturb trial court decisions on admissibility only in in-
stances of blatant abuse of discretion.
67
The two Fourth Circuit trends together frustrate the intended pro-
tection of Rule 404(b).' The effect is to indicate to trial courts that
similar acts evidence, whether prior to or subsequent to the crime charged,
is generally admissible and, furthermore, to suggest that appellate
courts will seldom reverse rulings permitting admission. 9 Since the
range of acceptable uses for similar acts evidence is almost infinite, the
prosecution can always justify admitting the evidence."0 Judging by the
Fourth Circuit's continued adherence to the two trends, the Fourth Cir-
cuit will rule most similar acts evidence admissible under Rule 404(b)
and will affirm most trial court decisions that the probative value of the
evidence outweighs the prejudicial impact.
7 1
Although the Fourth Circuit trends frustrate the intended purpose
of Rule 404(b),12 the Hadaway decision nevertheless is consistent with
the approach other circuit courts have taken,7 3 and, at least in form, with
the principles underlying Rule 404(b).74 Rule 404(b) codified the federal
Id. at 88.
See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit trend to admit similar
acts evidence).
" See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit trend to affirm trial
court's ruling).
Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 220-21 (Widener, J., dissenting); see FED. R. EVID. Rule 404(b)
advisory committee note. The advisory committee's note to Rule 404(b) states that the rule
seeks to avoid undue prejudice to the defendant. Id. An overly broad interpretation of Rule
404(b) frustrates the goal. See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit
trend is to rule similar acts evidence admissible and to affirm trial court admissibility
ruling).
See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 2 (1977).
United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 134 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979
(1973); MCCORMICK, supra note 5, at § 190.
"' See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit trend is to rule similar
acts evidence admissible and to affirm trial court admissibility rulings).
72 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit trend frustrates purpose
of Rule 404(b)).
" United States v. Mack, 643 F.2d 1119, 1122 (5th Cir. 1981) (court determined whether
probative value of evidence outweighs prejudicial impact to defendant); United States v.
Espinoza, 578 F.2d 224, 227 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 849 (1978); United States
v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1248 (2d Cir. 1978) (same); United States v. Czarnecki, 552 F.2d
698, 702 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 939 (1977); United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d
895, 905 (8th Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976).
"' See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (Rule 404(b) and associated case law).
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practice concerning similar acts evidence that existed prior to its adop-
tion. 5 The rule admits all evidence of a defendant's similar activities that
is relevant to the issues at trial unless the evidence is offered solely to
prove criminal disposition.7 6 The Federal rule is inclusionary in form in
that the language of the rule favors admission of similar acts evidence
unless its sole probative value is to show a defendant's criminal pro-
pensity." A number of the circuit courts have used the inclusionary form
of Rule 404(b) as an instrument to allow greater admissibility of similar
acts evidence than federal practice permitted prior to enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence." Despite the judicial interpretation of the
" See United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 85 (4th Cir. (1980) (Rule 404(b) codified
prior federal doctrine); United States v. Hajal, 555 F.2d 558, 568 (6th Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 849 (1977); United States v. Rocha, 553 F.2d 615, 616 (9th Cir. 1977) (same);
United States v. Goichman, 547 F.2d 778, 782 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976) (same); see also WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 55, at § 404[08] (Rule 404(b) merely codifies prior law). The Fourth Cir-
cuit permitted the introduction of evidence of other crimes prior to the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See United States v. Smith, 446 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1971)
(other crimes evidence admitted); United States v. Weems, 398 F.2d 274, 275 (4th Cir. 1968)
(evidence admitted to show motive), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1099 (1969); United States.v.
Copeland, 295 F.2d 635, 637 (4th Cir.) (other crimes evidence admitted), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 955 (1962); Swann v. United States, 195 F.2d 689, 690-91 (4th Cir. 1952) (similar acts
evidence admitted to show intent); Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 388-89 (4th Cir.
1948) (evidence admitted to show identity and intent), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 834 (1949).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 85-86 (4th Cir. 1980) (other crimes
evidence admissible, except when relevant to show only character or disposition); United
States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1978) (same); United States v. Long, 574 F.2d
761, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1978) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985 (1978); United States v. Riggins,
539 F.2d 682, 683 (9th Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977); see also
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 55, at § 404[08] (same).
" United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 85 (4th Cir. 1980); LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 45 (1978); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 55, at § 404[08]. An "in-
clusionary" formulation of the rule states that relevant evidence of other activity is admissi-
ble unless intended solely to show the defendant's criminal propensity. WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra 55, at § 404[081. The "exclusionary" formulation states that the rule holds
evidenc of other activity inadmissible unless the evidence is intended to establish a
specified factor important to the trial. Id.
78 See, e.g., United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 910 (5th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 766 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985 (1978); United States v.
Czarnecki, 552 F.2d 698, 702 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 939 (1977). The Beechum ma-
jority held that the Fifth Circuit's previous doctrine on the admissibility of other crimes
evidence, that the evidence had to be clear and convincing, did not survive the enactment of
Rule 404(b). Beechum, 582 F.2d at 910; see United States v. Broadway, 477 F.2d 991, 995 (5th
Cir. 1973) (clear and convincing standard) (overruled by Beechum). The Beechum court held
that the evidence of an extrinsic offense was relevant and the probative value outweighed
the danger of undue prejudice and therefore the evidence was admissible. Beechum, 582
F.2d at 910. The Beechum dissent argued that Rule 404(b) did not require overruling
Broadway and noted that other circuits continue to use cases decided prior to Rule 404(b).
Id. at 918-19 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). The Long court held that the inclusionary approach
of Rule 404(b) intends an emphasis on the admissibility of other crimes evidence. Long, 574
F.2d at 766. The Long court upheld the trial court's admission of a statement made by the
defendant in a prosecution for conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and making false material
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rule as enhancing admissibility of similar acts evidence, the rule does not
authorize automatic admission of the evidence. 9 The evidence must be
relevant for a purpose other than showing the character or disposition of
the defendant. 0 Furthermore, once the court decides that the evidence is
relevant, Rule 403 requires the trial court to balance the probative value
of the evidence against the prejudicial consequences of admitting the
evidence."1 The other circuit courts, as well as the Fourth Circuit,
recognize that courts must conduct a two-step evaluation of the evidence
before deciding whether similar acts evidence is admissible.82
Commentators, however, have criticized judicial treatment of
similar acts evidence, accusing the courts of admitting the evidence with
little or no analysis.83 Courts have recited permissible uses of similar
acts evidence listed in the rule, or mentioned balancing the probative
declaration to a grand jury. Id. at 768. While waiting to go into the grand jury room the
defendant admitted involvement in other payoffs. Id. at 764-65. The court admitted the
evidence as relevant to showing knowledge and willfulness when the defendant testified
before the grand jury and denied any involvement in bribery. Id. at 765. The concurring
opinion questioned the probative value of the testimony and criticized the trial judge for not
engaging in a Rule 403 analysis but concluded that the error was harmless. Id. at 768
(Adams, J., concurring). The Czarnecki court stated that prior to the enactment of Rule
404(b), evidence of other crimes had to be substantially similar and near in time to the of-
fense charged, had to be in issue, and had to have more probative value than prejudicial im-
pact. Czarnecki, 552 F.2d at 702. The Czarnecki court found that legislative history of Rule
404(b) suggested that the rule adopted enhanced the admissibilty of other crimes evidence.
Id. The court then held that evidence of other bad acts dissimilar to the offense charged is
admissible. Id.
" United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir. 1980) (Rule 404(b) does not permit
automatic admission of evidence); United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 432 (2d Cir. 1978)
(no evidence is presumed relevant or admissible).
o See United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir. 1980) (evidence admissible for
full presentation of crime); United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1248 (2d Cir. 1978)
(evidence admissible to impeach credibility); United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 906 (8th
Cir. 1975) (evidence admissible to show intent), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976); supra notes
28-33 and accompanying text (relevance requirement).
" Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 219; see United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 432 (2d Cir.
1978); supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (balance between prejudicial impact and
probative value); supra notes 6 & 7 (discussion of Rule 403). The advisory committee's
notes to Rule 404(b) also mention balancing the probative value against the prejudicial ima
pact. FED. R. EvID. 404(b) advisory committee note.
n, See supra notes 80 & 81 (two-step evaluation applied by circuits other than Fourth).
" See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 55, at § 404[08] (criticizes judicial treatment of
similar acts evidence); Payne, Jr., The Law Whose Life is Not Logic: Evidence of Other
Crimes in Criminal Cases, 3 U. RICH. L. REV. 62, 68-69, 85-87 (1968) (same); Slough &
Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IowA L. REV. 325, 349-50 (1956) (same). Weinstein
and Berger argue that in numerous cases involving Rule 404(b), especially cases involving'
certain crimes of conspiracy and possession, the courts admit similar acts evidence without
analysis. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 55, at § 404[08] (courts admit evidence without
analysis); Id. at § 404[09] (conspiracy cases); Id. at § 404[121[13] (narcotics possession cases).
Weinstein and Berger cite as an example United States v. Larson. Id. at § 404[08]; see
United States v. Larson, 555 F.2d 673, 675 (8th Cir. 1977) (no analysis before admitting
similar acts evidence). On the other hand, one commentator has stated that, although some
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value of the evidence against the prejudicial impact, and then admitted
the proferred evidence without any real analysis.' While some decisions
do lack analysis of the evidence in question, the Hadaway court did
undertake a three-prong inquiry into the probative value of the evi-
dence.85 But, when the Hadaway court proceeded to the balancing of the
probative value of the evidence against the prejudice resulting to the
defendant, the court disposed of the issue merely by concluding that the
jury instructions dissipated any prejudicial impact.86 The Fourth
Circuit's decision contains no other analytical discussion of the possible
prejudice to the defendant. 7 Furthermore, although the Hadaway court
decided that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the pre-
judicial consequences of admission,88 the Hadaway dissent better
evaluated the necessity of the evidence.89 The defendant had not
presented evidence to dispute the issue of intent and the prosecution
had sufficient evidence to show the defendant's intent and knowledge.8
The controlling issue in Hadaway, however, was not simply whether
the evidence was necessary, but whether the trial court's admission of
the evidence constituted an abuse of discretion.9 The district court has
the discretion, within limits,92 to decide whether the probative value of
courts do unjustifiably admit similar acts evidence, most of the cases have involved an incor-
rect label on an otherwise proper admissibility ruling. LILLY, supra note 77, at § 47.
8 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
85 Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 216-19; see supra note 7 and accompanying text (relevance,
reliability and necessity define probative value).
Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 219; see supra note 18 and accompanying text (Hadaway jury
instructions).
' See Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 219. The Hadaway court stated that the evidence was
prejudicial in that it increased the liklihood of conviction, but that it did not create the im-
pression that the defendant was an ogre who should be put in jail, whether guilty or not. Id.
Then the Hadaway court concluded that the instruction dissipated any prejudice to the
defendant. Id.
Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 219; see supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (Fourth Cir-
cuit's reasoning in Hadaway).
8" See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (dissent's reasoning on necessity
issue). The Hadaway dissent argued that the defendant did not dispute the issue of intent
and that the prosecution had sufficient evidence to show intent without the similar acts
evidence. Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 220 (Widener, J., dissenting).
The Hadaway dissent stated that the Fourth Circuit trend to admit similar acts
evidence ran directly counter to Michelson v. United States. Id. at 220 (Widener, J., dissent-
ing); see United States v. Michelson, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); supra note 51 and accompanying
text (discussing Michelson). But the Court has often recognized that proof of similar acts is
admissible to show a consistent pattern of conduct highly relevant to the issue of intent.
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 483 (1976). The Andresen Court considered the admis-
sion of similar acts evidence to show intent a well-established principle. Id. Therefore, the
Hadaway decision that the similar acts evidence was admissible to show intent is consistent
with Supreme Court precedent. Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 218; see Andresen, 427 U.S. at 483.
Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 220 (Widener, J., dissenting); see supra note 89 and accom-
panying text.
Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 217; see supra notes 63-65 (discretion of trial court).
" See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (discretion of trial court).
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the evidence outweighs the prejudicial consequences of admitting the
evidence. 3 The Fourth Circuit may reverse a district court only when a
lower court abuses its discretion." The abuse of discretion standard of
review requires a determination of clear abuse of discretion, not present
in Hadaway because the trial court did not act arbitrarily or
irrationally." Therefore, although the dissent's analysis and reasoning
on admissibility were superior to the majority's, especially regarding
the necessity issue,96 the Hadaway majority correctly affirmed the trial
court ruling because the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admit-
ting the similar acts evidence. 7
In United States v. Hadaway, the Fourth Circuit applied Rule 404(b)
and held evidence of similar acts admissible. 8 The decision continues the
Fourth Circuit trends to admit similar acts evidence through a broad, in-
clusionary interpretation of Rule 404(b) and to grant great deference to a
trial court's discretion to decide the admissibility of evidence.9 The ef-
fect upon the criminal justice system is to increase the judicial power of
the district courts that make the initial rulings on admissibility of
evidence.9 0 The curtailment of appellate review heightens the potential
for unjust results.' For that reason, the Fourth Circuit should stress
" Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 217; see United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 88 (4th Cir.
1980); United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir. 1977) (generous measure of
discretion required), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978); supra notes 63-65 and accompanying
text (trial court discretion).
" United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 88 (4th Cir. 1980).
'5 Id.; United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir. 1977); supra note 65 and ac-
companying text (admissibility ruling reversed only if arbitrary or irrational); supra note 13
and accompanying text (trial court's procedure for deciding admissibility of other crimes
evidence was not arbitrary or irrational).
The Robinson court stated that a Court of Appeals should not, and will not, substitute
its judgment for that of the trial court. Robinson, 560 F.2d at 515. The Robinson court also
stated that the practical problems of balancing the intangibles of probative value against
prejudice or confusion demand that appellate courts recognize a "generous measure" of
discretion vested in the trial judge. Id. (citing Construction Ltd. v. Brooks-Skinner Building
Co., 488 F.2d 427, 431 (3d Cir. 1973)). The Robinson court noted that an appellate court may
disagree with a trial court's decision but that the appellate court may be unaware of impor-
tant factors because the record does not adequately convey all that went on at trial.
Robinson, 560 F.2d at 515. See R. LEMPERT AND S. SALTZBURG, supra note 69, at 2 (appellate
courts are reluctant to reverse trial courts on basis of erroneous nonconstitutional eviden-
tiary rulings). See generally Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion Of The Trial Court Viewed
From Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 663 (1971).
See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (dissent's reasoning on necessity).
' Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 217; see United States v. Vincent, 681 F.2d 462, 465 (6th Cir.
1982) (abuse of discretion standard); supra note 13 and accompanying text (trial court's pro-
cedure for deciding admissibility was not arbitrary or irrational).
" 681 F.2d 214, 219 (1982).
See supra notes 56-74 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit trend).
'o See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text (trial court admissibility rulings rarely
distrubed).
"0' See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (lack of appellate review can frustrate
purpose of Rule 404(b)).
1983]
